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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee

:
:
• :

v.

LARRY NIEL BECKSTEAD,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

•

Case No. 20030217-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea to driving
under the influence with priors, a third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction of the
appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court properly reject defendant's claim that he was intoxicated
when he pled guilty where, although he smelled of alcohol, defendant responded
appropriately during the plea colloquy and exhibited no signs of impairment?
"[This Court] will not disturb the trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea unless it clearly appears that the trial court has exceeded its permitted range of
discretion." State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 4 4 , \ 9 , 1 P.3d 1108 (citing State v. Blair, 868
P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993)). Furthermore, "the trial court's findings of fact made in
conjunction with its decision will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous." Id.
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(quotation omitted). However, the trial court's compliance with procedural requirements
for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. State v.
Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, ^ 10, 983 P.2d 556 (Utah 1999).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-13-6(2)(a) (1999 & Supp. 2002):

A plea of guilty . . . may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and
with leave of the court.
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e):
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, . . . and may not
accept the plea until the court has found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has
knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of
innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a
speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and crossexamine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the
attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights
are waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the
offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would
have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is
sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by
the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit
culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a
substantial risk of conviction;
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence,
and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence,
that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and
plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
2
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(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any
motion to withdraw the plea; and
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is
limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the
record or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court
has established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged
the contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the
English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or
translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required
to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence with priors, a third degree
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (1998 & Supp. 2003). R3-4.
Defendant pled guilty as charged at a pretrial hearing held on 18 September 2002.
R41:10. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss another pending
felony DUI charge (id.). The trial court imposed a 0-5 year term of imprisonment on 23
October 2002. R7. Defendant filed a timely pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea on
18 November 2002. R10. An amended motion was filed by his counsel on 13 February
2003. R25. The trial court denied the motion on 14 April 2003. See Order from this
Court, dated 25 April 2003. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (id.).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Guilty Plea Hearing. On 18 September 2002, defendant pled guilty to driving
under the influence with priors. R41-.10.1 The trial court first informed defendant of the

'A copy of the 18 September 2002 hearing transcript is attached in addendum A.
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nature of the DUI charge, see R41:4, add. A, and what the State would have to prove if he
went to trial. R41:5, add. A. Defendant responded, "Yes, sir," when asked if he
understood (id.). The trial court also reviewed the rights defendant would be waiving by
pleading guilty. R41:6, add. A. Again defendant affirmatively responded, "I understand
that." R41:7, add. A. When the trial court asked if he was "under the influence of alcohol
or drugs here today in court," defendant responded, "No" (id.).
The trial court next asked defendant if he had had enough time to talk to his
attorney Mr. Miles, and defendant responded that he had not in fact talked to Mr. Miles
(id.). Mr. Miles then stepped forward informing the trial court that Mr. Allan,
defendant's appointed attorney, had had to leave and that he was standing in (id.). When
asked if he had had enough time to talk with Mr. Allan, defendant responded
affirmatively (id.).
The trial court also asked if defendant was then on parole or probation, which
defendant denied (id.). The trial court then explained the potential sentence: a 0-5 prison
term, a $5,000 fine and an 85% surcharge. R41:7-8, add. A. When asked if he had any
questions about the potential sentence, defendant responded, "No, sir." R41:8, Add. A.
Finally, the trial court asked if defendant required more time to discuss the case
with anyone (id.). Defendant indicated that he was "in charge of a bunch of livestock on
the mountain" and that he would "like to have at least a couple of days to, at least two
days to get them down and find somebody to take care of, take care of the animals" if he
pled guilty (id.). The prosecutor interjected that the parties' plea agreement entailed
4
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defendant being taken into custody that day (id.). The prosecutor also expressed concern
that defendant had been drinking because she could "smell it" on him (id.).
When the trial court asked defendant about his earlier denial of intoxication,
defendant admitted that he had been drinking that morning, but maintained that he was
"not under the influence." R41:9, add. A. Defendant reiterated that his main concern was
having time to find someone to care for his animals (id.). The trial court responded that
she could make no promises and wondered if that would make a difference as to
defendant's decision to plead guilty. R41:9-10, add. A. Defendant responded, "Not
really." R41:10, add. A.
Thereafter, defendant pled guilty as charged (id.). Pursuant to the parties' plea
agreement, the trial court dismissed another pending DUI charge (id.). The trial court
also had defendant taken into custody: "I understand your situation, but this is just too
dangerous to leave you out with this kind of a situation." R41:14, add. A.
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Denied. Thereafter defendant moved to
withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that he was "intoxicated at the time the guilty plea was
entered." R25.2 A hearing on the motion was held 5 March 2003. R41:59-67.3 The trial
court said it had previously reviewed the videotape of defendant's 18 September 2002
guilty plea hearing and proceeded to hear the parties' arguments. R41:61-66, add. C.

2

A copy of the motion is attached in addendum B

3

A copy of the 5 March 2003 hearing transcript is attached in addendum C.
5
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Defendant also addressed the trial court: "the officer that was here when I was arrested
said[,] c[Y]ou've not only been drinking, Mr. Beckstead, I've been an officer for 25
years,' and he said that I was highly intoxicated at the time and took me downstairs. . . .
And after I sobered up I understood how I messed up, Your Honor. I should have never
done that." R41:64, add. C. The trial court responded that the "real question [was] not
whether [defendant] had been drinking, but as [defense counsel] points out whether or not
you were intoxicated, whether you were so impaired that you didn't understand what you
were doing at the time you stood here in court and entered a guilty plea. That's, that's the
real issue here."
Defendant also claimed that he was to have been given some time to get his things
together, but "[a]ll that went out the, out the door[.]" R41:64-65, add. C.
The trial court denied defendant's the motion and entered the following findings:
. . . [A]s I look at the tape I don't see anything on the, the tape that
suggests to me that you were impaired. And I didn't notice anything at the
time we took the plea. I mean, I didn't see slurred speech, I didn't see
wavering or, or having trouble standing up or talking at all. I mean, you
seemed to understand all of the questions that I put to you and your answers
appeared to be articulate and coherent. So I think the fact that maybe you
had something to drink, I just don't think that that somehow impaired your
ability to enter that plea on the, on the day that you did.
So I'm going to find that we satisfied Rule 11. I'm also going to find
that the plea in this case was both voluntary and knowing. And you may
have been drinking, but I just don't think that you were under the influence
of an (sic) alcohol to a degree that it rendered you incapable of
understanding what was going on that day.
And so I'm going to deny the motion at this time, sir, to withdraw
the plea. And we'll leave the sentence imposed.
R41:66, add. C.
6
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
As acknowledged by defendant, the trial court's plea colloquy was complete.
Defendant's plea was therefore presumptively knowing. Although defendant claims he
was intoxicated at that time he pled guilty, his claim is not supported in the record.
Defendant fails to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's finding that he was
not impaired or to otherwise demonstrate any insufficiency. Thus, defendant has not and
cannot demonstrate any clear error on this record. The trial court's sound ruling denying
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea should therefore be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED DEFENDANT'S
CLAIM THAT HE WAS INTOXICATED WHEN HE PLED GUILTY
WHERE, ALTHOUGH HE SMELLED OF ALCOHOL,
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES DURING THE PLEA COLLOQUY
WERE "ARTICULATE AND COHERENT," AND HE EXHIBITED
NO SIGNS OF IMPAIRMENT
Defendant complains that his guilty plea was unknowing because he was
intoxicated at the time.4 Aplt. Br. at 11-18. See R41:64, add. C. The trial court rejected
defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, finding that, other than the smell of alcohol,

4

Defendant also appears to suggest that his plea was involuntary. See Aplt. Br. at 6
and 14. Involuntariness means official coercion. Cf. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,
167 (1986) (holding that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding
that a confession is not "voluntary"). However, defendant's sole factual basis for his
claim here is that he was too intoxicated to know what he was doing, a claim which if
supportable, suggests an unknowing rather than an involuntary or coerced plea.
7
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defendant exhibited no signs of intoxication or impairment at the time he pled guilty. The
trial court's ruling is well-supported and should be upheld.
Presumptively Knowing Plea. The law governing guilty pleas is clear. "A plea
of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with leave of
the [trial] court." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (1999 & Supp. 2002). To withdraw
such a plea "is a privilege, not a right" and is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.
State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,1f 9, 1 P.3d 1108 (quoting State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d
1040, 1041 (Utah 1987)). "[A] trial court's failure to strictly comply with Rule 11 in
accepting a guilty . . . plea constitutes good cause, as a matter of law, for the withdrawal
of that plea." State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 476 (Utah App. 1991). Conversely, however,
strict compliance with rule 11 creates a presumption that the plea has been voluntarily
entered. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ^ 11.
Here, defendant concedes that the trial court strictly complied with rule 11. He
only claims that he was unable to understand the plea colloquy because he was
intoxicated. Aplt. Br. at 10. Specifically, defendant faults the trial court for not inquiring
further, when immediately prior to the guilty plea, the prosecutor informed the trial court
that she believed defendant had been drinking because she could "smell the alcohol
emanating from [djefendant." Aplt. Br. at 14. However, defendant himself immediately
assured the trial court that although he had been drinking that morning he was not
intoxicated. See R41:9, add. A. Defendant's assurance was consistent with the trial
court's own observations. As found by the trial court at the motion to withdraw hearing,
8
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defendant's responses during the plea colloquy were appropriate and he exhibited no
signs of impairment: "I didn't see slurred speech, I didn't see wavering or, or having
trouble standing up or talking at all. I mean, you seemed to understand all of the
questions that I put to you and your answers appeared to be articulate and coherent. So I
think the fact that maybe you had something to drink, I just don't think that that somehow
impaired your ability to enter that plea on the, on the day that you did." R41:66, add. C.
Thus, because the record indsputedly demonstrates that the trial court strictly
complied with rule 11, defendant's plea is presumptively knowing. Gamblin, 2000 UT
44, H 11. Indeed, given his concession that the rule 11 colloquy was "complete,"
defendant cannot prevail without demonstrating that the trial court's finding, that he was
not impaired during the plea colloquy, is clearly erroneous.
Failure to Marshal. The law is well-settled that while an appellate court reviews
the denial of a motion to withdraw for an abuse of discretion, it will not overturn findings
of fact made in conjunction with that ruling unless the findings are clearly erroneous.
State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, \ 10, 983 P.2d 556. A trial court's findings are "clearly
erroneous only if they are 'are against the clear weight of the evidence'" or if the
reviewing court '"reaches a definite and firm conviction'" that they are mistaken. State v.
Gardner, 844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah 1992) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193)
(Utah 1987)). The burden is on the appellant to marshal all the evidence in support of the
trial court's findings and then to demonstrate that the evidence does not support the
findings. State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 460-461 (Utah 1994). If the defendant makes
9
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no attempt to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's ruling and to demonstrate
its insufficiency, this Court "'accept[s] the trial court's findings as stated in its ruling.'"
Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 17 (quoting Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60,1f 13).
Defendant has made no attempt here to marshal the evidence supporting the trial
court's findings of no impairment. See Aplt. Br. at 11-19. Rather, defendant "has simply
quoted those items from the record that arguably support his position." Gamblin, 2000
UT 44, T| 17. That is insufficient. Id. Specifically, defendant relies on his own selfserving testimony below that a booking officer with approximately 25 years of experience
told defendant that he was "highly intoxicated" and the officer considered charging
defendant with public intoxication. Aplt. Br. at 14 (quoting R41:64, add. C). Defendant
ignores the trial court's findings, based on its own memory of the plea proceeding and a
recent review of the videotape of the plea proceeding, that defendant's speech was not
slurred, that defendant had no trouble standing, and that defendant's statements and
responses during the colloquy were "articulate and coherent." R41:66, add. C. Thus,
considering the evidence of defendant's non-impaired behavior and viewing it in the light
most favorable to the trial court's ruling, defendant has not demonstrated clear error on
this record. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ^J 17 & n.2; See also Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817
P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991) (failure to marshal).
In sum, because defendant concedes that the trial court's plea colloquy was
"complete," his guilty plea was presumptively knowing. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ]f 11.

10
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Because defendant fails to the marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's finding
that he was not impaired at the time he entered the plea, let alone to demonstrate its
insufficiency, defendant fails to show any clear error in the trial court's finding. Id. at ^
17. He therefore necessarily fails to show that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Id. at ^j 9. His claim should therefore be
rejected.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm defendant's
sentence and the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on [0 December 2003.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

MARIAN DECKER
/Assistant Attorney General
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5
10

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
(September 18, 2002)
MR. MILES:

Your Honor, there's one other matter

that Camille has that we could, Larry Beckstead, 41.
THE JUDGE:

Forty-one?

All right.

State of

Utah versus Larry Beckstead, on for the pretrial conference,
case 1020.
MS. NEIDER:

Judge, in this case a, Mr. Beckstead

was a, cited on June 22nd of this year with another DUI that
we weren't aware of until this week.

So the state's

prepared to file that Information in that new case.

And

based on my discussions with a, Mr. Allan, Mr. Beckstead
would plead guilty to the new case.
the facts better in that case.

For some reason he liked

And I'll dismiss the old

case.
THE JUDGE:
MS. NEIDER:

Okay.'
He's been given a copy of the

Information.
MR. MILES:

That's correct, Your Honor.

THE JUDGE:

All right.

MR. MILES:

Mr. Allan, Bernie Allan spoke with

him, and that is our understanding.
THE JUDGE:

Now, do we need to have him waive the

prelim and all that?
MS. NEIDER:

Waive the preliminary—

Digitized by the Howard W. HunterCOURT
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PAGE 3

THE JUDGE:
MS. NEIDER:

Okay.
—

and he'll plead guilty on this

case, Judge Honor.
THE JUDGE:

All right.

Do you want to read the

Information or just waive the reading of the Information on
this new charge?
MR. MILES:

We'd waive the formal reading,

Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:

All right.

It looks like the charge

is driving under the influence of alcohol.

Essentially

alleges on or about June 22nd, 2002 he operated a motor
vehicle and he had a blood alcohol of .08 grams or greater,
or he was under the influence or incapable of safely driving
a motor vehicle.

And this is his third or subsequent

conviction within 10 years.
All right.

Right?

And you understand, Mr. Beckstead,

you're entitled to have a preliminary hearing on this new
charge?
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:
THE JUDGE:

Yes, sir.

I do.

Did you want to waive your right to

that preliminary hearing?
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

Yes, sir.

Over the deal we

made with the prosecution.
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

And you understand what that

means to waive your right to a prelim?
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DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

Yes, sir.
Does the state have any

objection to the waiver?
MS. NEIDER:
THE JUDGE:

No objection.
All right.

We'll find that he's

freely and voluntarily waived his right to a preliminary
hearing.
Now, he wants to enter a guilty plea on this
matter.

Is that correct?
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

Yes, sir.
And I just read to you in

essence what the Information or what the elements of the
offense are, Mr. Beckstead.
If you went to trial on this charge the state would
have to prove that you were driving a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol on June 22nd of 2002 here in
Weber County, and they would have to show thai" you had a
blood alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater, or you
were under the influence of alcohol to a degree which
rendered you incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle, and
they would have to prove that you had at least two or more
convictions within the last 10 years of driving under the
influence.
Is that what you did in this case?
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

Yes, sir.
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THE JUDGE:

Okay.

Did you want to give me a

factual basis again for what happened here?
MS. NEIDER:

Judge, on the new case a, on the date

in the Information he was stopped in Harrisville a, and as
part of their investigation they thought that he a, might be
under the influence of alcohol.
breathalyzer and blew a point

He did eventually take a
.085.

He does have two prior convictions within the time
frame.
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

All right.

And,

Mr. Beckstead, again you understand that you're not required
to plead guilty.

You're presumed to be innocent.

has the burden of proof here.

The state

If you went to trial they

would have to prove that to what's called beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Do you understand that by pleading guilty you're
going to give up a number of rights that you have.

You have

the right to what's called a speedy trial by an impartial
jury.

You have the right to have an attorney represent you

and, of course, Mr. Miles is here with you today.

You have

the right against self-incrimination.

You have the right to

confront and cross examine witnesses.

You have the right to

have witnesses subpoenaed on your own behalf at no expense to
you.

And finally, you have the right of appeal.
You're going to lose all of those by pleading
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guilty here today.
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:
THE JUDGE:

I understand that.

Now, you're not under the influence of

alcohol or drugs here today in court, are you?
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:
THE JUDGE:

No.

And have you had enough time to talk

to Mr. Miles about this?
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

I haven't talked to

Mr. Miles.
MR. MILES:

Mr. Allan was here and he had to leave

so I'm standing in.
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

So you had enough time to talk

to Mr. Allan about this?
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:
THE JUDGE:

Yes, sir.

And you're satisfied with his

advice?
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:
THE JUDGE:

(No recorded response).

Now you understand we've got this, at

least the other case set for trial here it looks like on the
26th, and I understand if you plead guilty that's going to be
dismissed.

Okay.
Now, are you on parole or probation right now?
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:
THE JUDGE:

No, sir.

Do you understand that this carries a

potential prison term, you could go to prison for this for up
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to five years.

It also carries a $5,000 fine and an 85%

surcharge on this offense.

Any question about that?

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:
THE JUDGE:

No, sir.

All right.

Do you need any more time

to talk to anyone about the case?
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

If I plead guilty, I'm in

was charge of a bunch of livestock on the mountain, I have a,
a camp.

I'd like to have at least a couple of days to, at

least two days to get them down and find somebody to take
care of, take care of the animals if I d o —
THE JUDGE:
today.

You're not going to be sentenced

I'm going to order what's called a presentence

report so you'll have some time between now and—
MS. NEIDER:

Judge, the agreement that I had with

Mr. Allan was that I was going to ask that he be taken into
custody today.
THE JUDGE:

Oh.

MS. NEIDER:

The reason for that was, otherwise,

otherwise he would have been felony on felony.
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

MS. NEIDER:

And frankly, he's been drinking today

and a, that concerns me.
THE JUDGE:
MS. NEIDER:

You say he has been drinking today?
I can tell he's been drinking.

I can

smell it.
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1

THE JUDGE:

2

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

3

THE JUDGE:

Well, I just asked you if you had had

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

I'm not under the influence,

Your Honor.

8
9

Well, it was early this

anything to drink, any alcohol or drugs, and you said no.

6
7

—

morning.

4
5

I thought I just asked you Mr.

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

You're not under the influence

of alcohol—
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

10

No (short inaudible, two

1 1 speakers) this morning.
12

THE JUDGE:

13

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

14

THE JUDGE:

19
20

I have a little bit of a

Well, I do too but I don't drink to

take care of it, so...

17
18

but you have been drinking.

back problem.

15
16

—

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

(Short inaudible, away from

mic) .
THE JUDGE:

All right.

Now, anything else we

need to cover before we take the plea, Mr. Beckstead?

21

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

I just want to have time to

22

get them animals and find somebody to take care of them.

23

appreciate that.

24
25

THE JUDGE:
guarantee.

Okay?

Well, I'm not going to make you a
Would that make a difference?
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1

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

2

THE JUDGE:

3

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

4

THE JUDGE:

5

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

6

On the plea?

I am (short inaudible, away

from mic).
THE JUDGE:

8

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

10

Not really.

All right.

7

9

Well—

cows.

All right.

To the charge—
—

(short inaudible, no mic)

I don't have anybody to, to take care of them.

need to get somebody up to take care of them.

I just

That's all,

1 1 that's all I'm worried about is the cattle.
THE JUDGE:

12

All right.

To the charge then of

13

driving under the influence of alcohol on June 22nd of this

14

year, how do you plead?

15

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

16

THE JUDGE:

Guilty.

All right.

I'll accept that plea.

1 7 And then you're going to move to dismiss the other case
18

that's pending?

19

MS. NEIDER:

20

THE JUDGE:

21

1020.

MS. NEIDER:

23

THE JUDGE:

25

And that is the case that ends in

It's also driving under the influence of alcohol.

22

24

Yes, Judge.

Yes, Judge.
All right.

We'll accept that plea

and we'll also dismiss the other case.
Now, do we need sentencing date on this?
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UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

October 23rd.

THE JUDGE:

October 23rd.

Okay.

All right.

Now, do we need to address this

question of whether or not we leave him out awaiting
sentencing?
MS. NEIDER:

Judge that was my a, that's what I

told Mr. Allan that I would be requesting.

Otherwise, he

would be out on a felony on felony and we could have just
tried that other case next week.
handle this livestock problem.

I know he wants time to
But frankly, I think in

the interests of safety of the public he be taken into
custody.
MR. MILES:

Your Honor, and I, and I understand

that she spoke with Mr. Allan.

I, I guess we wouldn't be

asking, from what he indicates it would just be a day or two
to get arrangements made b u t —
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:
MR. MILES:

—

Just two days, Your Honor.

we'll submit it to, to

Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:

Mr. Beckstead, have you got somebody

else that can take care of your situation?
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

I've got to go, I've got to

go out to (inaudible word) valley and find out if I can get
the co-owner, co-owner to take over his share of them, I
guess.

I know this is, this is...

I hadn't expected this.
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1

I expected to go to Harrisville and (short inaudible, away

2

from mic) down there to a Class B Misdemeanor, which is what

3

they offered me.

4

off the top of my head I don't know what I'm going to do

5

here.

And (short indecipherable, away mic) right

THE JUDGE:

6

Now I guess, my question is have you

7

got somebody else that can take of y o u r —

8

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

9

Not immediately, no.

I've

got to find somebody.

10

THE JUDGE:

Do you have family here?

11

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

12

THE JUDGE:

13

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

14

THE JUDGE:

Uh-uh (negative).

Friends?
My family all...

No.

Well, I tell you what, what troubles

15

me is the fact that you were out awaiting trial for a DUI and

16

then you commit the one you just pled guilty to.

1 7 show up in my court drinking.
18

time bomb, aren't you.

19

a little remiss?

21

24
25

Your Honor, all I'm asking

is 48 hours (short inaudible, two speakers).
THE JUDGE:

22
23

I mean, you are an absolute

If I, if I let you go aren't I being

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

20

And now you

Well, I know what you're asking but, I

mean—
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

And this was part of the

agreement which I've made with the prosecution, that I'd have
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time to take care of this.
THE JUDGE:

I know.

But I'm just a little

concerned about, I'm troubled over somebody who's awaiting
trial for a drinking offense, and then you commit a new one
while you're out there.
out free on bail.

I mean, I gave you the chance to be

And no.w you've committed a new crime.

now you show up in my court drinking.

And

And I'm just, I'm

kind of trying to figure out how, why I should let you go is
what I'm concerned about.
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

I'm not thinking of myself,

Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:

What?

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

I'm not thinking of myself

because (short inaudible, two speakers).
THE JUDGE:

Well I know that, that's pretty

obvious.
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

(Short inaudible, two

speakers)—
THE JUDGE:

What I'm worried about is those—

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:
THE JUDGE:

—

—

obligation of —

people out in Weber County that

run the risk of having you run into them.
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:
THE JUDGE:

I'm not driving today.

Do you have anything else, Mr. Miles,

that you wanted to say?
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MR. MILES:

Your Honor, I'm a little tied because

I believe that was what Bernie and her indicated.

But I

know Mr. Beckstead wanted to inquire about a couple days.
THE JUDGE:

Well, Mr. Beckstead, I'm going to

revoke your bail and have you taken into custody.

I

understand your situation, but this is just too dangerous to
leave you out with this kind of a situation.
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

Is there possibly a furlow

for 24 hours, to get out for 24 hours?
THE JUDGE:

No.

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:
THE JUDGE:

No.

To take care of this?

I've got you scheduled for

sentencing on October 23rd.
So you understand, Mr. Beckstead, you could be
going to prison on this.
anymore.

You've got so many priors that you've now, you've

now made it a felony so.
All right.
Okay?

This is not some misdemeanor

Okay?

We'll see you on October 23rd.

2:00 o'clock.
We'll strike that trial date then.

WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded.
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION

STATE OF UTAH
)

SS.

COUNTY OF UTAH

I, Penny C. Abbott, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify
that I received the electronically recorded videotape
#J091802

in the matter of STATE VS. BECKSTEAD, hearing date

September 18, 2002, and that I transcribed it into
typewriting and that a full, true and correct transcription
of said hearing so recorded and transcribed is set forth in
the foregoing pages numbered 1 through 15, inclusive except
where it is indicated that the tape recording was inaudible.
WITNESS my hand and official seal this 23rd day of May,
2003.

—x
\

/ X'
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER
License 2*M 0281 1-7801
Notary Public, Comm Exp 9-24-04
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STEPHEN A. LAKER (#1870)
PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, INC.,
OF WEBER COUNTY

... _
_
••• • - < ; ' ^ .-.-....

Attorney for Larry Niel Beckstead
2562 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 392-8247

^CwJ
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* »

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, '
STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT

FEB 13 2003

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,

MOTION TO WITHDRAW
PLEAOFGUILTY

VS.
LARRY BECKSTEAD

Defendant.

Case No. 021904375
JUDGE ERNIE JONES

COMES NOW DEFENDANT, by and through his Attorney, Stephen A. Laker, and hereby moves this
Court for an order allowing him to withdraw his plea of Guilty to the charge of in the above entitled
matter.
This Motion is made pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 77-13-6 and is based upon Defendant's
following reason:
1.

The Defendant feels he was "blind-sided, bullied, coerced and rail-roaded by the
Prosecutors".

2.

The Defendant feels that there was lack of support from the Public Defenders Office.

3.

The Defendant feels that he was misrepresented and let down by the defense attorney.

4.

The Defendant feels that he was intoxicated at the time the guilty plea was entered.

So MOVED this 12 day of February, of 2003.

STEPHEN A. LAKER
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

1
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STATE OF UTAH VS. LARRY BECKSTEAD
MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA OF GUILTY

Case No. 021904375
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY

I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy of the Foregoing, MOTION TO
WITHDRAW PLEA OF GUILTY,

this 12 day of February, of 2003, to:

WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., 2ND FLOOR
OGDEN, UTAH 84401

CMC 4145

CATHERINE' CROMPTON
SECRETARY
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
INITIAL APPEARANCE
ENTRY OF PLEA

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case
Appeal

LARRY NIEL BECKSTEAD,
Defendant.

BE IT REMEMBERED

021904375 FS
20030217-CA

Judge Ernie W. Jones

that this matter came on for hearing

before the above-named court on September 18, 2002.
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by
counsel, the following proceedings were held:

VOLUME I OF I INCLUDES:
9-18-02
10-23-02
11-27-02
1-08-03
2-05-03
3-05-03
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA
ORAL ARGUMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
VS,

Case
Appeal

LARRY NIEL BECKSTEAD,
Defendant.

BE IT REMEMBERED

021904375 FS
20030217-CA

Judge Ernie W. Jones

that this matter came on for hearing

before the above-named court on

March 5, 2003.

WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by
counsel, the following proceedings were held:

CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT
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A-P-P-E-A-R-A-N-C-E-S
FOR STATE OF UTAH:
CAMILLE L. NEIDER, ESQ.
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD, SECOND FLOOR
OGDEN UT 84401
FOR DEFENSE:
STEPHEN A. LAKER, ESQ.
2562 WASHINGTON BLVD.
OGDEN UT 84401
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
(March 5, 2003)
MR. LAKER:

This is Larry Beckstead, Your Honor.

THE JUDGE:

All right.

This was on, I guess

there was, it was a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, was
there not?
MR. LAKER:

Yes, Your Honor.

Actually what

happened was, was that he filed a, a pro se written motion.
THE JUDGE:

Right.

MR. LAKER:

You ruled that that was, was adequate.

THE JUDGE:

Right.

MR. LAKER:

You pulled me out of another court and

I came over.

And apparently you told me to a, to do... My

recollection was you told me to talk to Mr. Allan about this,
which I remembered doing.

But I did not in a timely fashion

file a formal motion to withdraw.

I have subsequently done

that.
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

MR. LAKER:

And so we're here for oral argument.

I need to let the Court know that a, Ms. Neider and
I have been downstairs, we've reviewed the tape of the
plea.

I don't know whether the Court has done that as well.
THE JUDGE:

It's right here.

Yes, I've looked at

MR. LAKER:

There isn't any question, Your Honor,

it.
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on the tape that a, that, that Mr. Beckstead had been
drinking.

I think Your Honor points that out, I think

Camille Neider points that out.

I think the defendant

actually points that out.
I think the question really becomes whether or not
he was quote unquote intoxicated to the place that he could
not understand what he was doing.
In the colloquy to my, you know, what I remember
hearing is, is that .you sort of chewed Mr. Beckstead out
because he had just got through answering you are you under
the influence of any alcohol or d r u g s —
THE JUDGE:

Right.

MR. LAKER:

—

THE JUDGE:

Right.

MR. LAKER:

And a, and then Mrs. Neider pointed

and he said no.

out that he'd, that a, she felt like he'd been drinking.
And he stated that he had, that he had had something to
drink.
THE JUDGE:

Right.

MR. LAKER:

And you chewed him out. because you

said he'd just, just said he hadn't.

And his response to

you was you asked me if I was, if, if I was under the
influence, not whether I'd been drinking.
THE JUDGE:

Right.

MR. LAKER:

And a, at this point in time he's
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alleging that a, not only had he been drinking but he was,
had been drinking a sufficient quantity to be intoxicated and
didn't understand what he was doing.
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

So your, your thinking is

what, that he didn't enter a knowing plea, knowingly?
MR. LAKER:

Yes.

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

MR. LAKER:

—

That's, that's our position—

is that he did not enter a knowing

plea because he was intoxicated at the time.
THE JUDGE:
wanted to add?

All right.

Ms. Neider, anything you

I did have a chance to read your response to

his motion a n d —
MR. SNIDER:

Judge, I don't think there's anything

on the tape that shows that it was anything but a knowing and
voluntary plea.

I think that he was definitely coherent and

answered your questions.

He a, responds appropriately.

doesn't seem to be swaying.

He

There's nothing evident on the

tape that would support his position now that he was
intoxicated.
And frankly, we're prepared to have Mr. Allan come
over and testify if necessary, Judge, that it was his belief
that he wasn't intoxicated.
Court wants.

And we can still do that if the

But after reviewing the tape, Judge, I don't

see that that would add anything other than a, what was there
and what the Court could see.
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I just don't think there's anything in his motion
that rises to the level of good cause.

We would ask that

you deny his motion then.
.

THE JUDGE:

All right.

Anything else,

MR. LAKER:

Anything you want to say?

Mr. Laker?

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

Just that the officer that

was here when I was arrested said you've not only been
drinking, Mr. Beckstead, I've been an officer for 25 years,
and he said that I was highly intoxicated at the time and
took me downstairs.

I said do you want to give me a

breathalyzer (short inaudible, away from mic), because they
were going to charge me with public intox (short inaudible,
away from mic).
THE JUDGE:

Well, you know, I think the real

question is not whether you had been drinking, but as
Mr. Laker points out whether or not you were intoxicated,
whether you were so impaired that you didn't understand what
you were doing at the time you stood here in court and
entered a guilty plea.

That's, that's the real issue here.

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

And after I sobered up

understood how I messed up, Your Honor.

I

I should have never

done that.
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

And the state had promised
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but never came through anyway.

But as far as, this is as far

as I remember, my plea bargain went out the window also
because I was arrested and intoxicated.
THE JUDGE:

What do you mean by that, I don't—

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

Well, I was supposed to have

been given some time to get my things together, a couple
days, so forth and so on.
jail time.

There was mention of a minimum

All that went out the, out the door when

Mr. Allan left apparently.

This is what I recall.

I'm not,

you know, when after he left and I pled guilty, the
prosecutor turned and asked that you place me in custody then
because I had been, I was intoxicated or had been drinking
that day.
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

Well, the problem I'm having

is there's no doubt that you'd been drinking.
finally admitted that.

I mean, you

Although initially when I asked you

that at the time of the p l e a —
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

Well nobody, nobody wants to

agree—
THE JUDGE:

Right.

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

—

you know, it's a public

embarrassment.
THE JUDGE:

But, but the question is whether or

not you had consumed so much alcohol that you didn't
appreciate, I guess, or understand what you were doing at the
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time you entered your guilty plea.

And, and that's why I

looked at the tape again.
And as I look at the tape I don't see anything on
the, the tape that suggests to me that you were impaired.
And I didn't notice anything at the time we took the plea. I
mean, I didn't see slurred speech, I didn't see wavering or,
or having trouble standing up or talking at all.

I mean,

you seemed to understand all of the questions that I put to
you and your answers appeared to be articulate and
coherent.

So I think the fact that maybe you had something

to drink, I just don't think that that somehow impaired your
ability to enter that plea on the, on the day that you did.
So I'm going to find that we satisfied Rule 11.
I'm also going to find that the plea in this case was both
voluntary and knowing.

And you may have been drinking but I

just don't think that you were under the influence of an
alcohol to a degree that it rendered you incapable of
understanding what was going on that day.
And so I'm going to deny the motion at this time,
sir, to withdraw the plea.

And we'll leave the sentence

imposed.
Now, you do have the right to appeal that—
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:
THE JUDGE:

—

We are going to appeal, yes.

and 30 days—

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

Yes.
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1

THE JUDGE:

—

to file a notice.

2

MR. LAKER:

He has, he has asked me, Your Honor,

3

to ask the Court for a post sentence relief, a release

4

pending, pending appeal at this time.
THE JUDGE:

5

6 motion at this time.
7

10

Well, I'm going to deny that

But you do have 30 days to file an

appeal s o —

.

.

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

8
9

Okay.

Can I orally file that right

now?
THE JUDGE:

Yes.

You need it file something in

1 1 writing though within 30 days—
12

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

13

THE JUDGE:

14

—

I have.

but you certainly can put that on

the record that you want to appeal the ruling.

15

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

16

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

17

MR. LAKER:

Are you going to handle that appeal

18
19

Okay.

through your lawyers at the prison?
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

I'm not sure how we're going

20

to do this.

21

I'm sure maybe we can have somebody pick it up.

22

how fast I can get the paperwork done in prison and appeal,

23

file it, if I can do it in 30 days.

If you can file an appeal and get it done then
I don't know

24

MR. LAKER:

We'll file a notice of appeal.

25

THE JUDGE:

All right.

That will be all then.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

COURT PROCEEDINGS

Good luck to you.
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded.
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STATE OF UTAH
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I, Penny C. Abbott, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify
that I received the electronically recorded videotape
#J030503

in the matter of STATE VS. BECKSTEAD, hearing date

March 5, 2003, and that I transcribed it into typewriting and
that a full, true and correct transcription of said hearing
so recorded and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing
pages numbered 59 through 68, inclusive except where it is
indicated that the tape recording was inaudible.
WITNESS my hand and official seal this 24th day of May,
2003.
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